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ATI'ORNEY-CLIENT-UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-INDEPENDENT
NEGOTIATION OF CLAIMS BY PUBLIC CASUALTY ADJUSTER-The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a licensed public cas-
ualty adjuster who independently negotiates claims on behalf of
third parties is an unauthorized practitioner of law whose practice
can be enjoined.
Dauphin County Bar Association v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229 (Pa.
1976).
In 1974, Augustus Mazzacaro, a public casualty adjuster licensed
under Pennsylvania's Public Adjuster Act,' was employed by sev-
eral insurance companies to settle claims on their behalf. Mazza-
caro also independently negotiated personal injury and property
damage settlements2 on behalf of third parties3 against tort-feasors
or their insurers. He undertook representation 4 of these third parties
only upon the assumption that the insurer was liable and that the
exclusive issue to be negotiated was the amount of the damages.5 If
either the insurance company or the insured contested liability,
Mazzacaro would withdraw his services and recommend that an
attorney be consulted. When liability was not at issue, Mazzacaro
conducted the entire settlement without the assistance of an attor-
ney. In the event the parties agreed upon a settlement, he would
collect a contingent fee.
The Dauphin County Bar Association filed an equity action seek-
ing to enjoin Mazzacaro from representing third parties in pursu-
ance of damage claims against either tort-feasors or their insurers
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 301-308 (1971). In Pennsylvania, one may not act as a public
adjuster without first having procured a public adjuster's license from the Insurance Commis-
sioner. Id. § 302.
2. At the trial, Mazzacaro testified that between fifty and seventy-five percent of his
business dealt with independent representation. Record at 107a, Dauphin County Bar Ass'n
v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229 (Pa. 1976).
3. A third party, as the term is used in Mazzacaro, is a person who has been injured by a
party who is insured and therefore has a claim for the loss against the insured or his insurer.
Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 230 n.2 (Pa. 1976).
4. Mazzacaro's services included interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, calculating
the amount of the damage, and writing a demand letter to the insurer. Brief for Appellee at
12, Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351A.2d 229 (Pa. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellee].
5. Mazzacaro contended that he would agree to represent an injured party only if the
insurer or the insured admitted liability. 351 A.2d at 230.
6. In Pennsylvania, an injunction is a proper remedy for unauthorized practice of a regu-
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It contended that Mazzacaro's public adjuster's license did not au-
thorize him to represent third parties,7 and such representation con-
stituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Pennsyl-
vania's statute prohibiting lay practice.' At trial, the chancellor
issued a decree nisi enjoining Mazzacaro's representation of third
parties.' Mazzacaro's exceptions' ° were overruled and a final decree
entered." He appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' 2
There were three grounds for Mazzacaro's appeal. First, he con-
tended that his public adjuster's license authorized him to represent
third-party claimants.' 3 Second, since his services were predicated
lated profession. See Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958) (defendant not
licensed to practice law in Philadelphia enjoined from practicing law there despite fact he
was licensed to practice before Supreme Court of the United States); McCarthy v. Panaccio,
49 Pa. D. & C.2d 501 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1969) (action by Philadelphia Bar Association to enjoin
defendant from preparing applications for Immigration and Naturalization Service); Felix v.
Wax, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 600 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1958) (equity action instituted by individual
physicians and their professional association to restrain defendant from practicing medicine
without a license).
7. The authority of a public adjuster is delineated in the Public Adjuster Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 301-308 (1971). The Dauphin County Bar Association contended that the use
of the term "assured" by the General Assembly restricts a public adjuster to the representa-
tion of parties against whom a claim is made. Thus Mazzacaro's license only permitted him
to adjust claims on behalf of the insurance company who issued the policy to the person
defending against the claim. The Association contended that if the General Assembly had
contemplated adjusters representing third-party claimants, it would have used a more gen-
eral term such as "claimant" or "injured party" in the Act. Brief for Appellee, supra note 4,
at 5.
8. The Bar Association contended that Mazzacaro's conduct violated PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 1610 (1962), which prohibits anyone who is not a member of the Pennsylvania Bar from
practicing law within the Commonwealth.
9. Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, Civil No. 3181 (C.P. Dauph. Co., Pa. Sept.
6, 1972). The chancellor ruled that Mazzacaro's independent representation was not author-
ized by his public adjuster's license and that his activities constituted the unauthorized
practice of law.
10. Mazzacaro excepted to the court's conclusion that a public adjuster's license did not
authorize him to represent third parties in claims against alleged tort-feasors. Dauphin
County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372, 374 (C.P. Pa. 1974). Mazzacaro also excepted
to the court's conclusion that the representation of third-party tort claimants constituted
unauthorized practice of law. Id.
11. The court held that Mazzacaro's public adjuster's license only authorized him to
represent insurance companies and the insured. Id. at 376. The court further held that he
must be enjoined from representing third parties to protect the public from potential incom-
petence. Id. at 378.
12. Jurisdiction was conferred on the supreme court by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act of 1970, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.101-.510 (Supp. 1976), which provides for direct
appeal to the supreme court from a final order of the court of common pleas in actions in
equity. Id. § 211.202(4) (suspended by PA. R. APP. P. 5105(a)).
13. 351 A.2d at 231. Mazzacaro claimed that the Public Adjuster Act authorized him to
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on the assumption of the insurer's liability, they did not involve the
exercise of legal judgment and consequently did not constitute the
practice of law. 4 Finally, he contended that the statute which pro-
scribes the practice of law by one not a member of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association"5 was unconstitutionally vague."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Pom-
eroy, affirmed the chancellor's decision. The court rejected Mazza-
caro's first contention on the basis of its grammatical construction
of the Public Adjuster Act. 7 Mazzacaro contended that the Act
defined two types of public adjusters: those who adjust claims aris-
ing out of insurance policies and those who assist the assured."8
Since he adjusted claims against insured tort-feasors, he believed
that his negotiations arose out of insurance policies and conse-
quently were authorized by the first definition in the Act. The court
refused to interpret the statute as authorizing third-party represen-
tation by laymen. The Act defined only one type of adjuster-a
person who adjusts claims arising out of an insurance policy and
gives advice to the individual protected by that policy. Since Maz-
settle third-party claims since the claims arose out of policies of insurance. See text accom-
panying note 18 infra. In the alternative, he contended that the term "assured" should be
interpreted as "a party making a claim for damages arising out of a policy of insurance."
Mazzacaro argued he was authorized to give assistance to a third party who was an assured
party. Id.
14. Mazzacaro emphasized that he did not negotiate a claim if his opponent contested
liability and therefore his services were the same as those of an adjuster employed by an
insurance company. His duties only involved expressing his opinion as to the monetary extent
of the tort-feasor's liability which he believed did not constitute the practice of law. Brief for
Appellant at 29-31, Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229 (Pa. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1610 (1962) provides: "Any person who shall practice law,
within this Commonwealth, without being a member of the Bar of a Court of Record, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor ...."
16. Appellant contended that the term "practice of law" is impermissibly broad under
the test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): "IThe terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties ...." Brief for Appellant, supra note 14, at 42.
17. See note 19 and accompanying text infra. The Act provides in relevant part:
The term, "public adjuster" . . . shall include every person ... soliciting business, or
holding himself ... out to the public, as an adjuster of claims for losses or damages
arising out of policies of insurance. . .and receiving any compensation or reward for
the giving of advice or assistance to the assured in the adjustment of claims for such
losses ...."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 301 (1971).
18. 351 A.2d at 231.
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zacaro was advising the injured party and not the insured, his inde-
pendent practice was not authorized by the Act.'9
The court next addressed the more troublesome question of
whether Mazzacaro's activity constituted the unauthorized practice
of law. It observed that an adjuster must probe the strengths and
weaknesses of his opponent's case as well as evaluate the likelihood
of his client's success in court. In the majority's view, one can only
do so by examining the particular facts in light of principles of torts
and rules of evidence. 20 Once an adjuster has assessed the claim
according to the applicable law, he knows the approximate amount
he can demand from the tort-feasor or his insurer. Since an experi-
enced lay adjuster such as Mazzacaro is not competent to appre-
ciate the legal problems and consequences involved, he is apt to
settle for a lesser amount than could be exacted. In the public's
interest the court sought to limit the negotiation of third-party set-
tlements to persons who can competently apply the law to the par-
ticular facts through the use of sound legal judgment'.2 Because it
concluded that Mazzacaro lacked the necessary professional train-
ing, his representation of third-party claimants fell within the
meaning of unauthorized practice of law.
The court summarily dismissed Mazzacaro's third contention. He
asserted that the statute prohibiting the practice of law by one not
a member of the Pennsylvania Bar was unconstitutionally vague
because it did not provide the public with an adequate definition
of the criminal conduct that was proscribed. However, Mazzacaro
was not permitted to attack the statute on those grounds because
he was prospectively restrained from engaging in specified conduct.
The court held that the injunction provided him with a sufficiently
definite standard for conforming his conduct; he was not permitted
to disregard this notice.
19. Id. Although Mazzacaro also contended that the term "assured" defined "any party
making a claim for damages arising out of a policy of insurance," the court determined that
"assured" defines the person who is subject to the risk of loss which the insurance policy has
been issued to guard against; the term did not encompass third parties as Mazzacaro con-
tended. Id.
20. 351 A.2d at 234.
21. "Where ... a judgment requires the abstract understanding of legal principles and
a refined skill for their concrete application, the exercise of legal judgment is called for." Id.
at 233, citing Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937) (where the application of legal
knowledge and technique is involved, the activity constitutes the practice of law). See note
29 infra.
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Justice Roberts filed a dissent which discussed the possibility of
having Mazzacaro's license revoked by the State Insurance Com-
missioner." According to Justice Roberts, it was within the Com-
missioner's power to regulate Mazzacaro's conduct. He believed
that the court was without jurisdiction because of the availability
of an administrative remedy.
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that legal advice given by a
layman constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.13 A major con-
cern has been that an injured party may not be able to judge the
competence of his representative. It is not enough to proscribe lay-
men from practicing in the courtroom. A counselor untrained in the
law can jeopardize his client's opportunity for a favorable settle-
ment more by way of unsound advice than through representation
in court where there is a judge to supervise his conduct. 4 A casualty
adjuster may persuade his client to believe that his expertise in
insurance enables him to negotiate with the proficiency of an
attorney.25 Since a primary function of tort law is to compensate
injured parties," courts have sought to ensure that only qualified
persons advise claimants in matters relating to the commission of
compensable torts. For this reason the Mazzacaro court agreed with
the legal profession's view that the handling of tort claims should
be reserved to practicing attorneys.27
Arguably, Mazzacaro's conduct did not constitute unauthorized
law practice since he did not advise clients of their legal rights and
liabilities. The court's emphasis on fully compensating injured par-
22. 351 A.2d at 235-36 (dissenting opinion). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 301-308 (1971)
empowers the Insurance Commissioner to revoke the license issued by the Commission if he
determines that the holder is incompetent or untrustworthy. Id. § 306.
23. See, e.g., Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934) (notary public enjoined from
furnishing legal services, including advice to clients, since it constituted unauthorized prac-
tice of law); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila. Co.
1939) (individuals enjoined from advising others on legal matters because it constituted
unauthorized practice of law). Other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., Spivak v. Sachs,
16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965) (New York statute forbidding unau-
thorized practice of law in New York includes giving legal advice).
24. See Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934). See also People v. Alfani, 227
N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919) (layman held himself out as being in the business of law and
drew legal papers).
25. See Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936) (claim adjuster convinced par-
ents of child killed as result of railroad's negligence that he could competently settle claim
on their behalf).
26. See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HsRv. L. Rav. 72 (1942).
27. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 3-1 to 3-4.
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ties may not seem persuasive because Mazzacaro was an experi-
enced adjuster with expertise in translating a particular injury into
a dollar amount. Yet the court's decision is defensible in light of its
added focus on sheltering the public" from incompetent laymen in
general." The relative ease with which a lay adjuster can obtain a
license to settle claimsss led the court to stress the need to prevent
improficiency by proscribing lay adjusters from acting in the de-
manding capacity of a lawyer. The requirements one must satisfy
to become an attorney" are designed to guarantee a minimum level
of competence in the profession, assuring a client that his represent-
ative can make a proper legal assessment of his claim.
The Mazzacaro court's concern with protecting potential clients
goes beyond securing a proper assessment of the extent to which the
damages should be compromised. By requiring that an attorney
28. Most jurisdictions have indicated that protection of the public is the primary reason
for enjoining laymen from practicing law. See Wilkey v. State ex rel. Smith, 244 Ala. 568, 14
So. 2d 536 (1943) (insurance adjuster gave advice to the insurance company that employed
him concerning subrogation rights); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934)
(insurance adjuster settled personal injury claims for a contingent fee); Shortz v. Farrell, 327
Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937) (claim adjuster prepared and filed pleadings as well as conducted
litigation in workmen's compensation cases). See also Kephart, Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 40 DICK. L. Rev. 225 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Kephart]; Note, The Unauthorized
Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Associations, 54 CALIF. L. Rev. 1331 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Unauthorized Practice].
29. In its discussion of the need for protection of the public, the court relied primarily on
Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937). Shortz involved a claim adjuster who prepared
and filed pleadings in workmen's compensation cases. He also represented clients before
workmen's compensation boards, conducting all phases of the litigation. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the adjuster could continue to prepare and file pleadings but it
enjoined him from practicing before the board. In the court's view, such practice involved
considering legal questions, applying legal rules, and judging facts in light of legal principles.
It therefore concluded that the claim adjuster was not competent to manage a case before a
workmen's compensation board. The court's rationale was that laymen must be prohibited
from practicing law to protect the public from the intrusion of inexpert and unlearned per-
sons. Id. at 86, 193 A. at 22.
30. Public Adjuster Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 301-308 (1971). It is relatively simple
to obtain a license under the Act. No legal training is required; a person need only pass a
test and apply to the Insurance Commissioner for a license. The application contains the
applicant's name, prior occupation and information concerning prior insurance licenses he
might have held. On the basis of this application, the Commissioner decides if the applicant
is trustworthy and competent to transact the business of a public adjuster. Id. § 304.
31. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the power to prescribe general rules concerning
admission to the Pennsylvania Bar. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); PA. SuP. CT. R. 7-9, 12, 14.
See also Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934) (notary public advertised that she
specialized in preparation of legal papers). See generally Kephart, supra note 28, at 226;
Unauthorized Practice, supra note 28, at 1334.
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oversee a prospective claim, a client is assured that his representa-
tive is bound by oath 3 to negotiate in his best interests. Unlike a
lay public adjuster, an attorney must affirmatively use his legal
experience,3 reveal all pertinent considerations to his client,' 3 and
formulate a professional opinion as to the outcome of the claim .35
Every action within the attorney-client relationship is also reviewa-
ble by the bar association, 31 and misconduct can subject an attorney
to disciplinary sanctions.37 This sanction is particularly significant
in view of the fact that Mazzacaro labored on a contingent fee basis.
A demand for the greatest possible amount would jeopardize his fee
because the insurer would be more inclined to litigate the claim.
Mazzacaro might therefore tend to settle for an amount less than
the injured party deserved for the sole purpose of insuring his fee.
While such a practice might subject an attorney to disciplinary
proceedings, a public adjuster has no such restriction since he is not
bound by an enforceable code of ethics. Furthermore, a client has
legal recourse against a negligent attorney who perfunctorily per-
forms his job,38 but no corresponding sanction exists against a lay
adjuster. These considerations led the court to believe that Mazza-
caro should only negotiate on behalf of insurance companies. The
company would provide Mazzacaro with the legal knowledge neces-
sary to handle the case and, by closely supervising him, the com-
pany could effectively eliminate his opportunity to conduct an un-
just settlement.39
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1603 (1962) provides that an attorney may not represent
another person until he swears to support the Constitution of the United States, to support
the constitution of the Commonwealth, and to faithfully use all his learning and ability on
behalf of his client.
33. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics, EC 7-5.
34. Id. EC 7-8
35. Id.
36. See Walker v. Kahn, 86 Pitt. L.J. 173, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (C.P. Allegh. Co. 1938)
(insurance agent interpreted and applied provisions of liquor license law on behalf of client).
37. Any breach of an attorney's oath can result in discipline ranging from private admoni-
tion by a disciplinary council to disbarment by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1661 (1962) (suspended by PA. SUP. CT. R. 1724(a)(3)), which provides
that an attorney is subject to suspension or removal from office for misbehavior; cf. In re
Alexander, 321 Pa. 125, 184 A. 77 (1936) (unfaithful or fraudulent conduct by an attorney on
behalf of his client is ground for disciplinary action). See also PA. SUP. CT. R. 17-4 (grounds
for discipline). Lack of an ethical code which a layman must adhere to makes comparable
disciplinary sanctions impossible.
38. An attorney is civilly liable to his client if he negligently performs his professional
duty. See Walker v. Kahn, 86 Pitt. L.J. 173, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (C.P. Allegh. Co. 1938).
39. See 351 A.2d at 234 n.7. The distinction between an independent adjuster and a
1976-77
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Since Mazzacaro never determined liability or advised a client of
his legal rights, the court's decision may represent an extension of
the existing law relating to unauthorized practice of law. Because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court justifed its holding on broad
grounds of public protection, the decision provides a basis for en-
joining acts of other laymen whose occupations require them to deal
with legal or quasi-legal matters. Real estate management and tax
counseling, for example, are two fields where laymen tangentially
deal with legal concepts to the same extent as public casualty
adjusters. 0 In recent years the Pennsylvania Bar Association has
not challenged these practitioners as illegally practicing law.
Mazzacaro, however, may encourage inroads into areas the legal
profession has yet to challenge. It reaffirms the judiciary's belief
that laymen who are not professionally trained nor subject to disci-
pline should not be permitted to render legal services. The broad
definition of legal services used in Mazzacaro may allow the court
to implement this belief by permitting challenges to lay practice
even remotely related to the law. If a court is not willing to balance
the protection of the public with the public's interest in low cost
services rendered by laymen, it may grant attorneys a monopoly in
many fields traditionally handled by non-lawyers. To insure a pro-
per balance, Mazzacaro should be restricted to those areas where lay
assistance carries the greatest potential of injury.
Thomas J. Santone
company adjuster is highlighted in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d
945 (1939). The Missouri Supreme Court decided that an adjuster who independently settles
claims is practicing law, but an adjuster who settles claims on behalf of an insurance company
is authorized to do so. The distinction is that a company adjuster is primarily involved in
advising the company's claim counsel, whereas the public adjuster's conclusions and recom-
mendations are made directly to the client without the safeguard of an intervening opinion.
Id. at 965, 130 S.W.2d at 960.
40. In the area of real estate transactions, local and state bar associations throughout the
country have been concerned with the competency of laymen to handle aspects of conveyanc-
ing, particularly the title assurance process. They have sought injunctions against real estate
brokers and salesmen for the unauthorized practice of law in the use of printed forms of legal
instruments prepared by lawyers, the selection of such forms to be used, and the insertion of
words within the printed forms in connection with property transactions in which brokers and
salesmen are involved. The majority of jurisdictions confronted with these suits have permit-
ted real estate agents and brokers to use forms such as contracts of sale, options for purchase,,
deeds, and mortgages that have been prepared by attorneys. In the interest of public conveni-
ence and reduced costs, the courts have recognized the ability of these laymen to perform
acts within their expertise as established by standardized examinations, concluding that
merely filling in blanks on forms prepared by attorneys does not constitute the giving of legal
advice or practice of law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Indiana Real
Estate Ass'n, Inc., 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963).
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